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With the advent of the global economy, arbitration has become the
preferred mechanism for resolving international disputes. Today international
arbitrators resolve billions of dollars worth of disputes.' Arbitration has taken
*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska Law College. The author is grateful for the

comments of Susan Poser and Catherine Rogers in the preparation of these remarks. This article is a revised
reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2005, held at the House of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2005.
1.
Billions of dollars are at stake in international commercial arbitration. See Michael D
Goldhaber, Big Arbitrations,AMERICAN LAWYER, Summer 2003, at 22 (focusing on only 40 arbitrations with
a European connection that were worth over $200 million and describing a single arbitration related to a
merger worth up to US$26 billion and another claim related to a Kuwaiti project worth up to US$7 billion);
see also Joseph M. Matthews, Consumer Arbitration: Is It Working Now and Will It Work in the Future,
79-APR. FLA. B.J. 22, 24 (2005) (referring to significant amounts of money usually involved" in international
arbitration); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION
BuLLETIN 16:1, at 12 (2005) (indicating the amount in dispute in arbitration cases pending before the
International Chamber of Commerce and noting that the proportion of cases where the amount in dispute was
between US$1-50 million had increased to 52.4%). There are also significant amounts at stake in investment
treaty arbitration. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Arbitration: PrivatizingPublic
InternationalLaw Through Inconsistent Decisions,73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005) [hereinafter Franck,
InconsistentDecisions](noting that there are "billions and billions" of dollars of claims at stake in investment
arbitration); see also Michael D. Goldhaber, ArbitrationScorecard:TreatyDisputes, AMERICAN LAWYER,
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on such prominence in the international context that commentators express
"little doubt that arbitration is now the first-choice method of binding dispute
resolution" and has "largely taken over litigation."'
Arbitration has historically been extolled as a confidential, quick, and costefficient method for resolving disputes, which creates an internationally
enforceable award. Those virtues, however, have eroded with the expansion in
the number of parties using arbitration, the increasingly adjudicative nature of
the process and the shift in the group serving as arbitrators, which has grown
beyond the "grand old men" to a younger generation of arbitration technocrats. 3
Instead, arbitration may now take just as long and be just as costly as
litigation before national courts.4 Confidentiality has eroded as institutions
such as the American Arbitration Association (hereinafter "AAA") and
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter

Summer 2005, availableat http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/treaty0605.html (last visited Mar.
12, 2006) (noting that in the context of investment treaty arbitration there are at least 59 claims worth in
excess of $100 million).
2.
Adrian Winstanley, Why ArbitrationInstitutionsMatters, in LAW INTRANSITION: CONTRACr
ENFORCEMENT 39 (2001), available at http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/legal/5083.htm (last visited Mar. 12,
2006).
3.
See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING INVIRTUE 36-44 (1996) [hereinafter
Dezalay & Garth, VIRTUE ] (describing the evolution of international arbitration and the shift from grand old
men to arbitration technocrats).
4.
See CHRISTIAN BUHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
140-48 (1996) (noting the mixed evidence as to the decreased cost and efficiency of international arbitration
and suggesting that generally arbitration is not less expensive but it may be quicker); see also Jack J. Coe,
Jr., Toward A Complementary Use of Conciliationin Investor-State Disputes-A PreliminarySketch, 12
U.C. DAVIS INT'L L. & POL'Y 7, 11 (2005) (observing that arbitration "has come to resemble in many respects
common law style commercial litigation, albeit without the procedural predictability engendered by codes
of civil procedure and established rules of court" and arbitrators may do little to expedite a complicated
proceeding). This may, however, depend upon the type of the speed of the particular national court. For
example, in one case, the courts of India would allegedly take twenty-five years to resolve a dispute.
Bhatnagar v. Surrenda Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1227 (3d Cir. 1995) (referring to expert evidence that
the "Indian legal system has a tremendous backlog of cases--so great that it could take up to a quarter of a
century to resolve this litigation if it were filed in India."). In these circumstances, arbitration is likely to be
faster than court litigation. In contrast, Australian courts can be much more efficient. See Andy O'Donaghoe,
Small ClaimsDivisionEstablished: Fast,Cheap, InformalArenaforDisputeResolution, 30 N. WALES LAW
Soc'Y J. 61 (1992) (describing Australia's small claims court system, its utilization of various ADR
techniques and noting the the speedy resolution of disputes); Fiona Tito Wheatland, Medical Indemnity
Reform In Australia: "FirstDo No Harm", 33 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 429,437 (2005) (referring to Australia's
various "litigation streamlining processes to reduce the time and cost of litigation ...[implemented] under
the court management reforms that have been continuing at different speeds through most Australian
jurisdictions over the past decade."). In such an instance, the national courts of Australia may be more likely
to resolve disputes quickly and cheaply. During her remarks on the panel for which this paper was prepared,
Sherry Williams, a senior counsel at Halliburton, explained that in her experience arbitrations take less time
and cost half as less as litigation before U.S. national courts.
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"ICSID") draft rules with presumptions in favor of the public disclosure of
arbitral awards.5 Perhaps more significantly, the recent signing of the Hague
Convention on Choice of Courts means arbitration awards do not have the same
monopoly on streamlined enforcement mechanisms.6
Given these shifts in arbitration's paradigm,7 what is left to make
arbitration preferable to national court litigation? It is neutrality, but neutrality
in two different senses. First, there is neutrality of forum, where the place of
dispute resolution does not unfairly benefit either party or create a "home
court" advantage.8 One might call this international arbitration's function as a
geographical half-way house. Second, there is the neutrality of the decisionmaking process. In other words, having arbitrators who are bound to and
selected by the parties, but are nevertheless required to render decisions in an
"independent" or "impartial" manner, offers adjudicative neutrality.9
These remarks consider this second aspect of neutrality and the
appropriate role of arbitrators in the context of international arbitration. This
issue is neither new nor unique to international commercial dispute resolution.
As long ago as the 1930s and the 1940s, domestic U.S. labor arbitrators asked
similar questions about the appropriate role of arbitrators.' Thirty-seven years
5.
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
art. 27(8), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22090 (last visited Dec. 8, 2005) [hereinafter AAA
International Rules] (stating that unless the parties agree, the AAA "may publish or otherwise make publicly
available selected awards, decisions and rulings that have been edited to conceal the names of the parties and
other identifying details or that have been made publicly available in the course of enforcement or
otherwise"); International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Suggested Changes to the ICSID
Rules and Regulations 9 (May 12, 2005) (Working Paper of the ICSID Secretariat), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/052405-sgmanual.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2006) (introducing a
presumption for the publication of redacted arbitration awards) [hereinafter Working Paper].
6.
Instead, parties can now sign up to exclusive choice of court clauses, and when the Convention
is ratified, parties will have an opportunity to have those foreign court judgments enforced in the same way
as a sister state judgment. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, art. 3, June 30, 2005, 44
I.L.M. 1294 (2005); see also Jason Webb Yackee, Fifty Years Late to the Party? A New International
Convention For Non-Arbitral Forum Selection Agreements, INT'L LIT. QUART. (forthcoming 2005). The
Convention is not yet in force, however, and there are also a variety of reservations which countries could
adopt to narrow the Convention's scope.
7.
BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 4, at 148 (describing international arbitration's "metamorphosis
from a 'gentlemen's game,' where commercial disputes were resolved informally among peers, to a highly
sophisticated judicial procedure with amounts at stake that are 10 to 100 times larger than they used to be
30 years ago").
8.
William W. Park, Bridging the Gap in Forum Selection: HarmonizingArbitrationand Court
Selection, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (1998).
9.
See generally Andreas Lowenfield, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International
Controversies:Some Reflections, 30 TEx. INT'L L.J. 59 (1995); M. Scott Donahey, The Independence and
Neutrality of Arbitrators,9:4 J. INT'L ARB. 31 (1992).
10.

Labor arbitration specialists have explored whether arbitrators act as independent adjudicators
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ago, the U.S. Supreme Court in Commonwealth Coatingsalso grappled with the
appropriate role of arbitrators. At that time, Justice White wrote that "the Court
does not decide today that arbitrators are to be held to the standards of judicial
decorum of Article l1hjudges, or indeed of any judges. It is often because they
are men of affairs, not apart from the marketplace, that they are effective in
their adjudicatory function."' 1 Given the evolution of international arbitration,
however, it is now useful to re-consider the appropriate role of international
arbitrators.
Subject to the parties' clear agreement to opt for commercial determinations or partisan decision-making, arbitrators must provide independent,
adjudicative services in order to both honor the parties' expectations and
contribute to the legitimacy of international arbitration. This symposium piece
first addresses the expectations of the parties and describes how these
contribute to a conception of the proper role of international arbitrators.
Second, it describes the adjudicatory functions of international arbitrators and
discusses the importance of impartiality. Third, the piece considers potential
mechanisms for regulating arbitrator conduct. Finally, it speculates on the
future opportunities to promote the integrity of arbitrations and enhance the
legitimacy of international arbitration.
I. PARTY EXPECTATIONS

Arbitration is a creature of contract.' 2 This means that parties can contract
for what they want and expect from their dispute resolution process. Parties
articulate minimal expectations about the proper role of arbitrators by picking
a specific dispute resolution mechanism. This typically happens when parties
choose particular institutional rules, under which arbitrators must exercise their
discretion, or subjecting their agreement to national laws, which articulate
standards of appropriate arbitrator behavior.' 3 Such articulation creates a set
or take on a more flexible role designed to fix perceived gaps in parties' legal relationship. LAURAJ. COOPER,
THE PROCESS OF PROCESS: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, PROCEEDINGS OFTHE FtFrY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING (forthcoming

2006) (on file with author).
11.
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Corp., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968), reh'g denied,
393 U.S. 1112 (1969).
A Practical
12.
Claude R. Thomson & Annie M.K. Finn, Managing an InternationalArbitration:
Perspective,60-JUL. DISP. RESOL. J. 74, 76 (2005) (noting "arbitration is a creature of contract, [and] it can
be customized to meet the parties' needs."); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,570
(1960); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International
Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 82 (2000) (noting the consensual nature of
international arbitration).
See Robert M. Kossick, Jr. and Julian Fernandez Neckelmann, Structuring Private Equity
13.
Transactionsin Mexico, 6 NAFFA L. & BUS. REV. AM. 105, 154 (2000) (discussing choice of law clauses,
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of shared understandings and manages party expectations about the appropriate
role of decision-makers.
If parties wish to have a decision-maker who is an expert in a particular
industry who exercises commercial judgment but does not engage in legal
analysis, they might avoid arbitration entirely and instead choose expert
determination. 4 Likewise, if parties do not want neutral adjudicators but
instead want partisan arbitrators, they might adopt rules that do not require
arbitrator impartiality and independence. 5 In other words, parties who want a
commercial decision or partisan decision-making can and should specifically
contract do to so.
But these processes are not international arbitration as we know it. The
modem reality is that parties do not generally want the open-textured discretion
of international arbitration's past or rampant partisanship of decision-making. 6
Rather, they prefer the outcomes of their disputes to be warranted by a record
arbitration clauses, and specifying procedures to address dispute resolution); Volker Vietchbauer, Arbitration
in Russia, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 355, 434-36 (1993) (discussing the choice between available arbitral
institutions and ad hoc arbitration in Russia); Michael G. Weisberg, Note, Balancing CulturalIntegrity
Against Individual Liberty: Civil CourtReview of EcclesiasticalJudgments, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 955,995
(1992) (explaining that a "formal agreement to arbitrate requires a minimum standard of appropriate conduct
from the arbitrators in order for the proceeding to be legally valid.").
14.
See Dr. Loukas A. Mistelis, ADR in Englandand Wales, 12 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 167,202-04
(2001) (discussing expert determination as a form of ADR and alternative to litigation that is especially
appropriate to disputes in technical areas such as intellectual property or valuation); see generally JOHN
KENDALL, EXPERT DETERMINATION (2001). But see Alan Scott Rau, ContractingOut of the ArbitrationAct,
8 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 225, 233 (1997) (suggesting the proposition that "arbitration has its greatest utility
in providing expert determinations of contested matters of fact" is antiquated); Alan Scott Rau, The Culture
of American Arbitrationand the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 449, 487, 492 (2005).
15.
The American Arbitration Association, for example, historically did not require party-appointed
arbitrators to be independent and impartial; but this has recently changed. CompareAMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES, SEPT. 1, 2000, RULE R-19, available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22175#R-17 (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (only requiring independence and
impartiality for the neutral third arbitrator) with AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION RULES, SEPT. 15, 2005, RULE R-17, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 (last
visited Mar. 12, 2006) (abolishing the bias and dependence of party-appointed arbitrators by requiring all
arbitrators to be independent and impartial-unless the parties choose otherwise); see generally David J.
Branson, American Party-AppointedArbitrators-Notthe Three Monkeys, 30 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1 (2004)
(examining the historical shift in the approach of law and arbitration rules on the properness of appointing
neutral or biased arbitrators); see also Olga K. Byrne, A New Code of Ethicsfor CommercialArbitrators:
The NeutralityofParty-AppointedArbitratorson a TripartitePanel, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1815, 1823-32
(2003) (noting the evolution away from bias towards independent and impartial decision makers and the
neutrality historically required in international commercial arbitration).
16.
Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conductfor
InternationalArbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 347, 353 (2002) [hereinafter Rogers, Fit and Function];
Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the InternationalArbitrator,20 AM. U. INT'LL. REv. 957, 991 (2005)
[hereinafter Rogers, Vocation].
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and independent legal analysis-with a fair process that justifies the
expenditure of significant legal fees on dispute resolution in pursuit of broader
commercial objectives. 7
H.

ARBITRATORS AS ADJUDICATORS

A. The ParadigmShift
Historically, arbitration awards were not revered so much for their legal
analysis, but more for their sense of fairness and industry knowledge.' 8 But
with the proliferation of alternative dispute resolution, or ADR, mechanisms,
international business has become more sophisticated resolution of disputes.19
Arbitrators are no longer prized for their capacity to reach compromise
outcomes, particularly where other ADR mechanisms, such as mediation and
negotiation, can achieve this objective more efficiently.20 Today, businesses
use international arbitration to provide a neutral, adjudicative dispute resolution
process where arbitrators independently apply the law to facts, and this in turn
promotes the legitimacy of international arbitration.2'
See Rogers, Vocation, supra note 16, at 991-92; see also BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 4, at
17.
204-07 (explaining that international businesses need to calculate risks and take decisions in order to reduce
their risks and have effective conflict management and noting the concern parties express when arbitrators
do not act upon the basis of the record and try to mediate disputes); Delissa A. Ridgway, International
Arbitration: The Next Growth Industry, 54-FEB. DisP. RESOL. J. 50, 50-51 (1999) (suggesting that
international commercial arbitration is a growth industry because of parties' perceived fairness in the process
and the predictability and certainty of the result).
18.
Rogers, Fit and Function, supra note 16, at 350-55, 417; Catherine A Rogers, Regulating
InternationalArbitrator:A FunctionalApproach to Developing Standardsof Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 53,66 (2005) [hereinafter Rogers, Standardsof Conduct];see also Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Fussing
About the Forum: Categories and Definitions as Stakes in a Professional Competition, 21 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 285, 295 (1996).
See Van Anderson & Biff Sowell, StayingAhead of the ADR Curve in South Carolina,16-JUL
19.
S.C. LAW 37, 38 (2004) (observing that "the proliferation of ADR in our system ofjustice has dictated a more
thoughtful approach to dispute resolution" and discussing the obligation of lawyers to counsel their clients
on ADR options); see also BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 4 at 392-94 (noting international businesses have a
variety of dispute resolution options open which can be used dynamically to achieve the best result).
20.
Todd B. Carver, ADR-A Competitive Imperativefor Business, 59-OCT. DISP. RESOL. J. 67,
79 (2004) (reporting survey results that show that businesses perceive mediation as a more efficient way to
settle disputes and noting the decline of "splitting-the-baby" outcomes in arbitration); see also William W.
Park, Duty and Discretion in InternationalArbitration,93 AM. J. INT'L L. 805 (1999).
21.
Rogers, Vocation, supra note 16, at 988-89; see also Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and
Virtues of Lawlessness: A "SecondLook" at InternationalCommercialArbitration,93 Nw. U.L. REV. 453,
457-58 (1999) (referring to parties desire in international arbitration to have a "neutral adjudicatory process"
and not to opt out of legal rules but suggesting this approach is Western in orientation); Nathalie Voser,
Current Development: Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in International
Commercial Arbitration, 7 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 319, 356 (1996) (affirming that arbitrators can and should
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B. ArbitratorsAdjudicatory Function
Adjudicators perform common core functions. Adjudication is a decisionmaking process that permits party participation by submitting evidence and
offering reasoned arguments; it requires an adjudicator to render a final and
binding decision that is supportable based upon the record and the adjudicator's
independent judgment and legal analysis.22 When adjudication is infected with
partiality, it is not based upon reasoned application of applicable legal rules or
premised upon the parties' proofs-but rather on a decision-maker's personal
relationships, preconceptions, objectives, and interests.23
Modem international arbitration requires the objective application of rules
to facts and the exercise of bounded discretion to ensure that the process and
final outcome is warranted.24 While parties may pick arbitrators with particular
apply mandatory rules of applicable law as it supports the legitimacy of international arbitration).
22.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 (1982) (referring to adjudicative
functions); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (referring to adjudication as the "legal process of
resolving a dispute"); see also Rogers, Standards of Conduct, supra note 18, at 59-60 (describing the
adjudicatory function of international arbitrators and the link between impartial adjudication and normative
legitimacy); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, EthicsIssues in ArbitrationandRelated DisputeResolution Processes:
What's Happeningand What's Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 949,959-60 (2002) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics] (suggesting adjudicators share the desire to be fair and impartial but arguing that this requires
adoption of a standard code of ethics); Rogers, Vocation, supra note 16, at 987 (arguing "modem
international arbitration outcomes are like judicial outcomes in that they are produced by an objective
tribunal's reasoned application of established rules to facts."); but see Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus.,
Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n. 12 (8th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that the arbitration system is an inferior system of
justice "structured without due process, rules of evidence, accountability of judgment and rules of law");
BENJAMIN N. CARDozO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19-23 (1921) (describing the process of
applying precedent to unique legal and factual situations).
23.
Rogers, Standardsof Conduct,supranote 18, at 69; see also Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter,
Determninacy, Objectivity and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 565 (1993) (suggesting that when judges
are faced with the penumbra of general legal terms "a judge has no option but to help fix the meaning through
the exercise of a discretionary authority") (citing H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593, 607-15 (1958)).
24.

INT'L

CHAMBER

OF

COMMERCE,

RULES

OF

ARBITRATION

art.

7

(1998),

httpJ/www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/pdf-documents/rules/nilesarb-english.pdf(ast visited Mar.
12, 2006) (requiring arbitrators to be "independent" and sign a statement of independence) [hereinafter ICC
RULES]; LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES] art. 5.2 (1998), available at
http://www.lcia.orglARBjolder/arbenglish main.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (requiring arbitrators to
be "impartial and independent") [hereinafter LCIA RULES]; RULES OF THE ARBITRATION INSTrTE OF THE
STOCKHOLM

CHAMBER

OF

COMMERCE

arts.

6,

17

(1999),

available at

http://www.chamber.selarbitration/english/rules/scc_rules.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (requiring the
tribunal and the SCC to be impartial and independent); U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, ARBITRATION
RULES arts. 7, 9-10, U.N. Doc A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976) (requiring arbitrators to be impartial and
independent and permitting challenge for lack of these qualities) [hereinafter UNC1TRAL Rules]; see also
Rogers, Standards of Conduct, supra note 18, at 60 n.39 citing Susan H. Shin, Comparison of the Dispute
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cultural and legal backgrounds and specific personal experiences,25 arbitrators
also generally have an obligation to disclose those matters that would call into
question their independence.26 Although all humans are inevitably influenced
by their experiences, in international arbitration, parties ask arbitrators to put
Settlement Proceduresof the World Trade Organizationfor TradeDisputes and the Inter-American System
for Human Rights Violations, 16 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 43, 95 (2003) (suggesting that the failure to carefully
define the role of adjudicators in other contexts has undermined the legitimacy and efficacy of those systems);
Laurence Shore, DisclosureandImpartiality: An Arbitrator'sResponsibility Vis-A-Vis LegalStandards,57APR DIsP. RESOL. J. 32, 79 n.51 (2002) (suggesting international arbitration is about private adjudication).
But see Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 487 (1997) (suggesting
impartiality is traded for expertise and asserting parties prefer a hearing that is more a form of private selfgovernment than a form of private adjudication); see generallyMerit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d
673 (7th Cir. 1983).
See Toby Landau, Report, Composition and Establishment of the TribunalArticles 14 to 36,
25.
9 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 45, 59 (1998); James F. Hogg, Civil JusticeReform Introduction,24 WM. MrrCHELL
L. REV. 287, 293 (1998).
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 24, art. 9 (requiring a "prospective arbitrator shall
26.
disclose to those who approach him in connexion [sic] with his possible appointment any circumstances
likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence"; ICC RULES, supra note 24, art.
7.2 (requiring a prospective to "disclose in writing to the Secretariat any facts or circumstances which might
be of such a nature as to call into question the arbitrator's independence in the eyes of the parties"); LCIA
RULES, supra note 24, art. 5.3 (requiring an arbitrator to "sign a declaration to the effect that there are no
circumstances known to him likely to give rise to any justified doubts as to his impartiality or independence,
other than any circumstances disclosed by him in the declaration"); see also U. N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade
Law Report, Model Law on InternationalCommercialArbitration, Annex 1, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/40/17
(June 21, 1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law Report (requiring an arbitrator to "disclose any
circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence"); English
Arbitration Act § 24, 1996 (Eng.), availableat, http://www.opsi.gov.uklactslactsl996/1996023.htm (last
visited Mar. 27, 2006) (permitting courts to remove arbitrators where "circumstances exist that give rise to
justifiable doubts as to [their] impartiality") [hereinafter English Arbitration Act]; INTERNATIONAL BAR
ASSoCIATION, GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT'L ARBITRATION 7 (2004), available at

http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/guideines%20text.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (offering a set
of non-binding standards that require arbitrator an arbitrator to be objectively independent and impartial and
requiring an arbitrator to disclose those matters which "may, in the eyes of the parties, give rise to doubts as
to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence") [hereinafter IBA GuIDELINES].
27.
See generally CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES (Daniel Kaneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000);
see also CARDozO, supranote 22, at 13 (suggesting that humans "may try to see things as objectively as we
please. Nonetheless, we can never see them with any eyes except our own."); Rogers, Standardsof Care,
supra note 18, at 68 (noting that "absolute impartiality is impossible as a matter of cognitive psychology");
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking the Mass out of Mass Torts: Reflections of a Dalkon ShieldArbitratorOn
Alternative Dispute Resolution, Judging, Neutrality, Gender, and Process,31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513, 546
(1998) (suggesting "we hold some notion of neutrality, objectivity, or impartiality over our head, like an
unreachable halo to remind us of what we need to aspire to, as we work on cases situated before us, where
we are grounded in who we are"). But see JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-50 (1971) (suggesting
that it possible to ensure superhuman impartiality by insulating decision makers from their own selfish
personal interests but acknowledging this still permits some common human emotions and attitudes to operate
behind the veil).
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aside biases in order to fairly and impartially exercise their independent
judgment and apply their expertise to the facts on the record to render a
decision based upon the law.28
C. FunctionalDistinctionsBetween Arbitratorsand Judges
While the current literature suggests that arbitrators' urge to render neutral
and impartial decisions reflects the "judicialization" of arbitration,29 arbitrators
differ from judges3" in fundamental ways. 3 1 But these distinctions need not
detract from an international arbitrator's obligation to engage in impartial
decision-making. Irrespective of whether the decision-maker is a national court
judge or an arbitrator, the neutral adjudicative function should be fostered to
32
encourage impartial analysis and decision-making.

28.
Henry Gabriel &Anjanette H. Raymond, Ethics ForCommercialArbitrators:BasicPrinciples
and Emerging Standards,5 WYO. L. REV. 453,453-56 (2005); Roger S. Haydock & Jennifer D. Henderson,
Arbitration and Judicial Civil Justice: An American Historical Review and a Proposal for a
Private/Arbitraland Public/JudicialPartnership, 2 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 141, 195 (2002); Chiara
Giovannucci Orlandi, Ethicsfor InternationalArbitrators, 67 UMKC L. REV. 93, 93-94 (1999).
29.
Rogers, Standards of Conduct, supra note 18, at 67; see generally INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION IN THE 21 ST CENTURY: TOWARDS "JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY? (Richard B. Ullich
& Charles N. Brower, eds., 1993); see also Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation
in InternationalArbitrationProcedure,30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 89, 95 (1995). But see Jose E. Alvarez, The New
Dispute Settlers: (Half)Truths and Consequences, 38 TEx. INT'L L.J. 405, 411-15 (2003) (describing as a
"half-truth" the principle that "[t]he recent proliferation of international tribunals constitutes the
'judicialization' of international law.").
30.
Judges in different countries differ dramatically. While some may adhere to the rule of law,
there are other jurisdictions where this is less likely to be true. Kif Augustine-Adams, Consideringthe Rule
of Law: A Step Back from Threats and Dangers, 15-SPG EXPERIENCE 14, 16 (2005); see also Matthew J.
Spence, American Prosecutorsas Democracy Promoters: Prosecuting CorruptForeign Officials in U.S.
Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1185, 1187-88 (2005) (discussing the lack of adherence to the rule of law in
developing countries, such as the Ukraine); Frank K. Upham, Who Will Findthe DefendantIfHe Stays With
His Sheep? JusticeIn RuralChina, 114 YALE L.J. 1675, 1709 (2005) (noting that "basic court judges in rural
China have little in common with the visions dancing in senators' heads when they condition aid on progress
toward the rule of law"); Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom,and Prosperity,10 Sup. CT. ECON.
REV. 1, 2 (2003) (describing how in Eastern Europe "societies have struggled to rediscover the rule of law"
and how in "impoverished kleptocracies of Africa, the challenge is even greater and the lack of even
embryonic rule of law institutions is stark").
31.
Susan D. Franck, The Liability of InternationalArbitrators: A Comparative Analysis and
Proposalfor QualifiedImmunity, 20 N.Y. L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 23-24 (2000) [hereinafter Franck,
Liability].
32.
See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, supra note 22, at 959-60 (recognizing that judges and arbitrators
are adjudicators and that "impartiality and neutrality, are a necessary part of maintaining the integrity and
legitimacy" of the dispute resolution process); see generally, IBA GUIDELINES, supra note 26; Dezalay &
Garth, VIRTUE, supra note 3.
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Conducting a functional analysis of the common adjudicative goals of
arbitration and litigation can offer insights about the appropriate role of
arbitrators.33 Judges and arbitrators share certain functional similarities, which
relate to the adjudicative nature of their decision-making obligations.34 Some
similarities implicate the nature of the decision-maker's mandate, the
independence of adjudication and internal checks on discretion. Other
functions implicate their administrative obligations, including effective casemanagement and providing parties notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Irrespective of the external distinctions, these two core functions require both
arbitrators and judges to perform their role in a fair, efficient, and impartial
manner.
1. Adjudicatory Role
The mandate of arbitrators and judges relates to their jurisdiction and the
entities to which they are responsible. There are subtle differences in the
mandate of arbitrators and judges. Judges derive theirjurisdiction and authority
from the state, whereas arbitrators derive their jurisdiction from parties.3 5
Nevertheless, the state indirectly sanctions arbitration to the extent national
legislation or judicial decisions permit arbitration.36 These differences are
Such an analysis can create an independent basis of arbitrator impartiality, which in turn
33.
"reinforces the normative legitimacy of the international arbitration system." Rogers, Standards of Conduct,
supra note 18, at 59-60. This legitimacy encourages states to permit private resolution of important public
issues, which might otherwise be resolved by courts and not permitted to be the subject of arbitration. See
generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990) [hereinafter Franck,
POWER OF LEGITIMACY] (referring to various indicators of legitimacy); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITIMONS (1995) [hereinafter, Franck, FAIRNESS]; Deseriee A. Kennedy,
PredisposedWith Integrity: The Elusive QuestforJustice in TripartiteArbitrations,8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
749, 768 (1995) (suggesting that if adjudication ignores "fundamental judicial precepts of neutrality and
impartiality... [then] the integrity of the entire process is undermined."); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633-34 (1985) (holding that anti-trust claims are arbitral and
commenting favorably on the independence, impartiality and experience of the international arbitrators
involved in the case); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 21 (1991) (permitting the
arbitration of RICO claims and declining "to indulge [the] speculation that the parties and the arbitral body
will not retain competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators, especially when both the [institutional]
rules and the FAA protect against biased panels."); see also Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas.
Corp., 393 U.S. 145, 151 (commenting favorably on the impartiality and fairness of modem arbitrators)
(White, J. concurring).
Hong-lin Yu & Laurence Shore, Independence, Impartiality,and Immunity ofArbitrators-US
34.
and English Perspectives, 52 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 935, 960 (2003); Franck, Liability, supra note 31, at
18-24.
35.
Imre S. Szalai, The New ADR: Aggregate DisputeResolution and Greentree FinancialCorp.
v. Bazzle, 41 CAL. W. L. REv. 1, 45 (2004); George Day Constr. Co. v. United Bd. of Carpenters, Local 354,
722 F.2d 1471, 1474 (9th Cir. 1984).
36.

Kennedy, supranote 33, at 768-69; see generally, Richard C. Reuben, ConstitutionalGravity:
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minor and should not affect an adjudicator's capacity and willingness to render
impartial decisions.
Arbitrators and judges also differ as to whom they are ultimately
responsible. This distinction implicates both how decision-makers are
remunerated and how they are selected. The government collects taxes to pay
judges from parties who may or may not be litigants, whereas parties are
directly responsible for the remuneration of arbitrators.37 On its face, a more
direct financial relationship might appear to affect the outcome; nevertheless,
this need not be the case, particularly where the parties have contracted for
decision-makers who are independent and impartial.3 8 There are also
distinctions related to the appointment process. Judges tend to be randomly
assigned to cases, whereas parties have a hand in selecting their decisionmakers.39 Presumably this means that parties using arbitration have a greater
control in selecting a decision-maker' ° whose professional, legal, and cultural
experiences may predispose them to understanding evidence and arguments in
a particular way. 4' It does not, however, necessarily predispose the outcome,
particularly where there may be the effect of balancing of such inherent biases
by a three-member tribunal.42
A Unitary Theory ofAlternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice,47 UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000).
The state also retains residual jurisdiction in those instances when it determines claims are not arbitral. Alan
Scott Rau, The ArbitrabilityQuestion Itself, 10 Am.REV. INT'L ARB. 287, 290-293 (1999).
37.

Franck, Liability, supra note 31, at 23.

38.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice, 70
TENN. L. REV. 63, 94-95 (2002) (discussing the problem of potential bias in hopes of future business from
"repeat players"); Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 709
(2001).
39.
Rogers, Fit andFunction, supranote 16, at 356,357; Rogers, Standardof Conduct,supranote
18, at 56-67; Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of LitigationandArbitration:An
Application to FranchiseContracts, 32 J. LEGAL STuD. 549, 559 (2003).
40.
To the extent that parties believe that they have greater control over the process, they are more
likely to buy-in psychologically to the dispute resolution process; this in turn is likely to decrease the parties'
dissatisfaction with the process and lead to an award that a party is less likely to contest. See Tom R. Tyler,
ProceduralFairnessand Compliancewith the Law, 133 Swiss J. ECON. & STATISTICS 219, 222-27 (1997)
(suggesting that compliance with the law is linked to the legitimacy of the authorities and the procedural
fairness of administering the law); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WrrHOuT GIVING IN27 (2nd ed. 1981) (observing that if parties "are not involved in the process,
they are hardly likely to approve the product" and instead arguing that parties should be given a stake in the
process).
41.
Judges, just like arbitrators, are human beings with a concomitant set of experiences and
predispositions. See supranote 27, and accompanying text (referring to Justice Cardozo's observations about
the partiality of judges and human beings).
42.
See S. I. Strong, Intervention and Joinderas of Right in International Arbitration: An
Infringement of Individual ContractRights or a ProperEquitable Measure?, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L.
915, 929 (1998) (suggesting "arbitrators rule on the facts and legal or equitable principles before them, not
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There are also distinctions in the checks placed upon judges' and
arbitrators' exercise of discretion. Irrespective of the variances in how discretion is restricted, there is a common theme. The discretion of both arbitrators
and judges has limitations, and such limitations do not prevent them from
impartially and fairly adjudicating disputes.
One way to check the unfettered discretion of decision-makers is through
adherence to the rule of law. For example, common law judges are bound by
precedent.43 While arbitrators are not necessarily bound by precedent-nor do
they create de jure precedent-adherence to precedent is not an indispensable
element in the adherence to the rule of law. Judges in civil and Islamic law
countries, for instance, are constrained by rules articulated in the civil code and
rely less infrequently on precedent.'
Arbitrators are subject to a slightly different check on their discretion; the
parties' agreement. More specifically, arbitrators are not only bound by the
parties' agreement about the extent of their discretion but they are also bound
by the express or implied rules of law the parties have chosen.4 5 Where parties
bring controlling law and persuasive authority to a tribunal's attention-bound
as they are by the parties' agreement as to the scope of their authorityarbitrators can and should neutrally evaluate the relevant case law to render a
fair and impartial decision. Adhering to traditional concepts of fair and
on party affiliation" and that the most lawyers "can do is make an educated guess, based on each candidate's
professional background, as to who might be more inclined toward a particular perspective.").
43. See generally LEGAL RuLES AND LEGAL REASONING (Larry Alexander ed., 2000); James
Hardisty, Reflections on Stare Decisis, 55 IND. L.J. 41 (1979); Frederick Schauer, Precedent,39 STAN. L.
REv. 571, 589, 595-96 (1987); see also Scott T. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the
Accused andthe InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the FormerYugoslavia, 10 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. I11,
118 (1998) (suggesting that a lack of precedent in courts with common law traditions is troubling).
44. Dr. Abou Ramadan, JudicialActivism of the Shari'ahAppeals Court in Israel(1994-2001):
Rise and Crisis, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 254, 273 (2003) (explaining that "on the substantive level Islamic
law does not recognize the principle of binding precedent"); Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, FirstWorldwide
Congress on Mixed Jurisdictions: Salience and Unity in the Mixed Jurisdiction Experience: Traits,
Patterns,Culture, Commonalities: Language and Style in a Mixed System, 78 TuL. L. REv. 151, 172 (2003)
(discussing the lack of common law precedential restraint and instead the notion of restraint and interpretation
in civil law traditions).
45. See, e.g., Mohammad Reza Baniassadi, Do Mandatory Rules of Public Law Limit Choice of
Law in InternationalCommercial Arbitration?, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 59, 65 (1992); Sigvard Jarvin,
The Sources and Limits of the Arbitrator'sPowers, 2 ARB. INT'L 140 (1986); Bernard G. Poznanski, The
Nature and Extent of an Arbitrator'sPowers in InternationalCommercialArbitration,4 J. INT'L ARB. 71,
84 (1987). Should an arbitrator fail to adhere to their legal obligations, it may be possible to hold an
arbitrator directly liable for their inappropriate conduct. See generally Franck, Liability, supra note 31;
Andrew T. Guzman,ArbitratorLiability: Reconciling Arbitrationand MandatoryRules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279,
1303-06 (2000); Peter B. Rutledge, Towarda ContractualApproach ForArbitralImmunity, 39 GA. L. REV.
151 (2004); see also supra note 31 and infra notes 80, 82 (discussing the possibility of arbitrator liability for
inappropriate conduct).
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consistent treatment4 6 both honors the parties' agreement and promotes the
integrity of an adjudicative system.47
Another way to check the discretion of decision-makers is to create a
process which reviews their decision. While arbitrators and judges are subject
to different review processes, both processes provide an opportunity to evaluate
their conduct. Typically, judges' determinations are judicially reviewable for
substantive and procedural errors.4 8 In contrast, while some jurisdictions do
permit a limited evaluation of the legal merits of a tribunal's award, 9 the
international trend is to review the procedural aspects of an arbitrator's award.5 °
46.
Treating similarly situated individuals similarly is a classic element of the rule of law. Ann
Althouse, Saying What Rights Are-In and Out of Context, 1991 Wis. L REV. 929, 949 (1991); Schauer,
supra note 43; see generally Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights under
Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J INT'L L. & POL'Y, 47,
55-62 (2005) (describing the importance of consistent treatment in arbitration) [hereinafter Franck, Bright
Future].
See Franck, FAIRNESS, supra note 33 at 41-46 (suggesting that adherence to traditionally
47.
accepted norms and approaches is likely to increase the legitimacy of a methodology). Investment treaty
arbitration, for example, is struggling with the proper application of law to fact this issue as tribunals are
creating a body of defacto precedent upon which parties rely in planning their conduct and to which tribunals
refer when articulating the bases of their decisions. See Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at
1612; Franck, BrightFuture,supranote 46, at 57; see generally Franck, POWER OF LEGITIMACY, supranote
33.
48.
Arthur D. Hellman, Error Correction,Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court's Exercise of
DiscretionaryReview, 44 U. Prrr. L REv. 795, 796 (1983) (referring to the error correcting function of
appellate courts); David W. Robertson, Allocating Authority Among Institutional Decision Makers in
LouisianaState-CourtNegligence and Strict Liability Cases, 57 LA. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (1997) (indicating
that appellate judges review various issues in a "variety of procedural and substantive contexts.").
In the United States, for example, courts can vacate arbitral awards where a tribunal "manifestly
49.
disregards" the law, specifically where a tribunal correctly states the law and subsequently ignores it. See
Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (articulating the "manifest disregard" dictum followed by
subsequent courts) overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989); see also Howard M. Holtzmann & Donald Francis Donovan, National Report on the
UnitedStates, in INTERNATIONALHANDBOOKONCOMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 53,58 (Pieter Sanders & Albert

Jan van den Berg eds., 1998) (describing the "non-statutory ground of 'manifest disregard' as a basis for
vacating an award in the United States") [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK]; see generally Noah
Rubins, "Manifest Disregardof the Law" and VacaturofArbitralAwards in the United States, 12 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 363 (2001) (describing the application of "manifest disregard" in various circuits). England also
provides for limited review of arbitral awards. English Arbitration Act, supra note 26, § 69 (permitting, for
example, appeal on a point of law where the appellate court agrees to hear the case, "determination of the
question will substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties" and "the decision of the tribunal on
the question is obviously wrong"). But see Robert Briner, National Report on Switzerland, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, infra at 33-35 (noting that "even a clear violation of the law or a manifestly
wrong finding of facts are as such not sufficient to constitute" a grounds for setting aside awards);
UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, arts. 35, 36 (failing to provide appeal on a point of law as a ground
for vacaturor denying recognition and enforcement).
50.

See Park, supranote 20, at 815 (explaining "most legal systems do not impose merits review").
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Procedural review does not prevent a meaningful review of awards, however.
Arguably, the various procedural mechanisms can be used as a substitute gauge
of the appropriateness of the award. 5 Moreover, arbitrators, likejudges, do not
like to have their awards annulled, set aside or denied enforcement, and
arbitrators tend to exhibit a great deal of care to retain the integrity of the
process.' 2 Ultimately, this suggests that the review process makes arbitrators
and judges functionally similar, and such similarity suggests that arbitrator's
should strive to apply the applicable law in a neutrally and fair manner.
2. The Administrative Function
Both judges and arbitrators are being increasingly called upon to manage
the dispute resolution process fairly and efficiently. 53 The administration of the
dispute resolution processes are different. Judges must adhere to rigid rules of
civil procedure and evidence; whereas, subject to party agreement, arbitrators
have discretion to articulate the applicable procedures.5 4 Nevertheless, both
judges and arbitrators should manage the adjudicative process efficiently and
fairly. Judges in the United States, for example, often have a great deal of
discretion to engage in case management, and typically these decisions are only
reversed upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.56 Arbitrators are held to a
51.

Id. at 817.

52.
See Guzman, supra note 45, at 1282 (observing arbitrators have an incentive to act properly "in
order to develop a reputation as a desirable arbitrator"); Steven Walt, Decision By Division: The
ContractarianStructure Of CommercialArbitration,51 RUTGERS L. REv. 369, 411-13 (1999) (observing
international arbitrators have an incentive to behave impartially and properly in the resolution of disputes lest
there be an adverse effect upon their reputation); but see Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, supra note 22, at 956
(suggesting that arbitrators may experience a conflict of interest where they may be repeatedly appointed by
one parties and that they "must 'satisfy' or please the choosing parties sufficiently to be chosen again,
particularly if the arbitrator is more or less a full time arbitrator who depends exclusively on arbitration for
income").
53.
See Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America,
and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration,16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 301,322-23 (2004) (discussing the
essence of a stable legal order).
54.
Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in InternationalArbitration
Procedure,30 TEX. INT'LL.J. 89,90 (1995); see LCIA RULES, supranote 24, art. 22; ICC RULES, supranote
24, art. 15; UNC1TRAL Rules, supra note 24, art. 15; see also Kennedy, supra note 33 (suggesting that,
unlike in arbitration, rules of evidence and procedure in court litigation result in consistent judicial processes
and noting the flexibility inherent in arbitration).
55.

See generally Garcia,supra note 53.

56.
See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1268-1269 (11 th Cir. 2001)
(noting a "court is entitled to establish proper pre-trial procedures and set an appropriate pre-trial schedule"
and holding "the district court did not ... abuse its discretion" in this case.); State ex rel. Appalachian Power
Co. v. MacQueen, 479 S.E.2d 300, 305 (W. Va. 1996) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by formulating a trial-management plan to consolidate all pending asbestos premises-liability cases, and
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different standard but with a similar objective of facilitating a fair process.
Should arbitrators fail to abide by the parties' agreement in conducting the
proceedings or exceed their discretion, the award can be set aside or denied
enforcement.57 While there are critical distinctions between arbitrators and
judges,58 the differences are not so broad as to prevent either type of adjudicator
from evaluating the merits in a neutral manner and managing the process
impartially.
11.

OPPORTUNITIES TO ADDRESS MISCONDUCT

The formalization of the legal process is a function of international
arbitration's impulse to promote the rule of law, recognize their vital role as
neutral adjudicators and foster the internal integrity of the process.59 Nevertheless, human beings are not perfect. There are a variety of opportunities to
address perceived misconduct and offer incentives to ensure that arbitrators
maintain an independent and impartial role. These opportunities can occur
during the proceedings, after the proceedings and through other informal
mechanisms, or "market forces."
A. During the Proceedings
During an arbitration, there are opportunities to challenge arbitrators for
inappropriate conduct based upon information--either disclosed or undisclosed

stating that "this case is probably the best example of why a trial court should be given broad authority to
manage its docket...").
57.
See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, art. V(2), June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (establishing the grounds for refusing enforcement of
arbitral awards) [hereinafter New York Convention]; Swiss Private International Law Act on International
Arbitration, arts. 190, 194, in National Report on Switzerland in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note
49, Annex IL 4-5 [hereinafter Swiss Arbitration Law]; English Arbitration Act, supra note 26, §§ 68, 101
(establishing the grounds for vacating and denying enforcement of arbitral awards); UNCITRAL Model Law,
supra note 26, arts. 34(2)(a)(ii-iii), 36(l)(a)(ii-iii).
58.
Arbitrators, for example, only have jurisdiction over the parties to an arbitration agreement; they
have limited or no authority over non-parties. See, e.g., Jason F. Darnall & Richard Bales, ArbitralDiscovery
of Non-Parties,2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 305 (2001) (discussing the split of opinion in U.S. courts over whether
arbitrators should be able to order pretrial discovery from non-parties and advocating a broad-power
approach). Judges, in contrast, have the authority over parties and non-parties subject to its general
jurisdiction.
59.
Although in the past the flexibility and lack of adherence to precedent has been a strength of
arbitration, there is a growing literature to suggest this presumption may no longer be correct-particularly
in the international context where users of international arbitration demand more certain and reasoned
outcomes. Rogers, Fitand Function,supra note 16, at 366-67; Rogers, Vocation, supranote 16, at 976-80.

514

ILSA Journalof International& Comparative Law

[Vol. 12:499

-which indicates arbitrators are not acting impartially or independently. 6'
Typically, these challenges can either be brought before an arbitral institution
and/or a national court.6' The general trend is to challenge and remove
arbitrators where there are circumstances that give rise to justifiable doubts
about an arbitrator's independence or impartiality.62
Defining the meaning of "independence" and "impartiality" can be
challenging. Arbitral institutions tend not to particularize these standards.63
The workings of the ICC Court, which evaluates arbitrator challenges, are
confidential.' National courts also give mixed guidance about the meaning of
the phrase. For example, in the United Kingdom, the AT&Tv. Saudi Cable case
suggested that Yves Fortier's inadvertent non-disclosure of his role as a nonexecutive director with one of AT&T's primary competitors was insufficient
to lead to "real danger of bias."65 In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Commonwealth Coatings held that inadvertent non-disclosure of a business
relationship with a party did create an appearance of bias and partiality.'
Some extreme cases do offer some guidance. The infamous case of
Challengeto ArbitratorsKashaniandShafeiei involved a physical attack in the
Peace Palace against a Swedish arbitrator at the U.S. [you might want to do a
60.
See Yu & Shore, supra note 34, at 963; see also ICC RULES, supra note 24, art. 11; LCIA
RULES, supra note 24, art. 10; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supranote 24, arts. 10-11; English Arbitration
Act, supranote 26, § 24; Swiss Arbitration Law, supranote 57, arts. 179-80; UNCITRAL Model Law, supra
note 26, arts. 12-13.
61.
ICC RULES, supra note 24, art. 11 (permitting the ICC Court to rule on challenges to
arbitrators); LCIA RULES, supra note 24, art. 10 (permitting the ICC Court to remove arbitrators if an
arbitrator "dies, falls seriously ill, refuses, or becomes unable or unfit to act" or "if circumstances exist that
give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence"); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra
note 24, art. 12 (providing that challenges can be made by appointing authorities); English Arbitration Act,
supranote 26, § 24 (providing that a court can remove an arbitrator if where "circumstances exist that give
rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality); Swiss Arbitration Law, supra note 57, art. 180(l)(c)
(permitting party to challenge of an arbitrator in court where "circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable
doubts as to his independence"); UNCITRAL Model Law Report, supra note 26, art. 13 (permitting courts
to hear challenges to arbitrators).
62.
For a discussion of the arbitrator independence and neutrality and comparison of the U.S.
justifiable doubt standard with British real danger standard see generally Yu and Shore supra note 34;
Orlandi, supra note 28, at 96-103 (comparing a variety of civil law and common law countries' conceptions
of arbitrator independence and impartiality).
63.
See ICC RULES, supra note 24, arts. 7.2-7.3; LCIA RULES, supra note 24, arts. 5.2-5.3;
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 24, arts. 6.4, 9.
64.

ICC RULES, supra note 24, app. 1, art. 6.

65.
AT & T Corp. v. Saudi Cable Co., [2000] 2 All E.R. 625 (Eng. C.A. 2000); see Branson, supra
note 15, at 29; Gabriel & Raymond, supra note 28, at 458 n.28; but see A.S.M. Shipping Ltd. of India v.
T.T.M.I. Ltd. of England, [2005] All E.R. 271 (Q.B. 2005) (removing an English arbitrator for reason of
"apparent bias").
66.

Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Corp., 393 U.S. 145, 150.
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global check for punctuations in abbreviations of US and UK]-Iran Claims
Tribunal by two Iranian arbitrators who claimed the neutral arbitrator was
"already a corpse" because he had sided with the U.S. 67 The removal of the
Iranian arbitrators in this case suggests that where conduct "shocks the
conscience" and undermines confidence in the integrity of the dispute resolution system, arbitrators will be dismissed.6" But perhaps what shocks the
conscience of one legal culture with a strong tradition of the rule of law may be
less likely to shock the conscience of someone from a different legal or cultural
tradition.
B. After the Proceedings
Immediately after the tribunal renders an award, there are also
opportunities to address inappropriate conduct. First, parties can seek to vacate
the award at the seat for procedural irregularities. 69 But some countries, such
as England, provide limited opportunities to review awards for errors of law.70
Second, during enforcement proceedings, parties might use New York
Convention grounds to argue arbitrator misconduct should result in the denial
of recognition of the award. 7
While arbitrators-similar to trial courts-do not like to have their awards
vacated or denied enforcement,72 there is also a lack of clarity as to what
arbitrator conduct is sufficient to affect the integrity of the award adversely."
Memorandum Re: Challenge to Arbitrators Kashani and Shafeifei by the Government of the
67.
United States of America, 7 IRAN U.S.-CL. TRiB. REP. 281, 292 (1986) [hereinafter Memorandum]. One
Iranian judge was quoted as saying: "If Mangard ever dares to enter the tribunal chamber again, either his
corpse or my corpse will leave it rolling down the stairs." IranianJudge ThreatensA Swede at The Hague,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1984, at A5. Subsequently, the Tribunal's President suspended all tribunal proceedings.
U.S.-Iran Arbitration Suspended at The Hague, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1984, at A9.
68.

See Memorandum, supra note 67, at 296-98.

9 USC § 10 (2005); English Arbitration Act, supranote 26, §§ 67-96; Swiss Arbitration Law,
69.
supra note 57, art. 190; UNCITRAL Model Law Report, supranote 26, art. 34; see generally William W.
Park, Illusionand Reality in InternationalForum Selection, 30 TEx. INT'LL.J. 135,186 (1995); ALBERTJAN
VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION (1981).

70.

English Arbitration Act, supra note 26, § 69.

71.

See generally New York Convention, supranote 57; JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS

& STEFAN M. KROLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2003).

See David E. Robbins, Calling All Arbitrators: Reclaim Control of the Arbitration
72.
Process-The CourtsLet You, 60 APR. DIsP. RESOL. J. 99 (2005) (suggesting that "arbitrators are fearful that
the courts, when reviewing their conduct, will vacate their awards"); Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock ofNAFTA
Chapter 11 in its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues and Methods, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1437 (2003) (indicating that "[w]hen vacatur occurs, the award's flaws--and by
extension, the arbitrators' missteps--are typically made public, further discouraging ill-considered awards.").
73.

The FAA does articulate general standards as to what conduct is sufficient to lead to vacatur
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While it might be useful to have a clearer set of guidelines as to what type of
arbitrator misconduct will result in non-recognition or vacatur [you might want
to run a global on the term vacatur-it's a term of art and is typically in italics],
this will depend on the national law of the courts evaluating the award.74
C. Market Forces
There are three different types of market forces that offer an opportunity
to remedy arbitrator misconduct and provide guidance as to the appropriate role
of international arbitrators. First, professional reputation and word of mouth
in the arbitration marketplace can impact arbitrator conduct. Second, other
market-based incentives can create incentives for appropriate behavior. Third,
institutional incentives can provide guidance for arbitrator conduct and provide
incentives for appropriate conduct and adverse consequences for improper
conduct.
1. The Arbitrator Marketplace
The internal arbitrator marketplace, where professional credibility and
word-of-mouth recommendations affect appointment and re-appointment of
arbitrators, plays a significant role.75 Arbitrators can earn hundreds of
of the award. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2005) permits vacatur:
(1) [W]here the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators . . .; (3) where the
arbitrators... refus[ed] to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of the any party have been prejudiced.)
Courts, however, have come to mixed results in interpreting these standards.
See, e.g., Stephanie Smith, EstablishingNeutrality in ArbitrationsInvolving CloselyKnit Industries, 12 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 237, 238 (2001) (noting the
confusion in U.S. courts on the standard of partiality required for vacatur). Things can
get even more challenging when one considers that different national laws, which are
also likely to vary, may apply to the issue of what type of arbitrator misconduct is
inappropriate. See, e.g., James M. Gaitis, Internationaland Domestic Arbitration
Procedure: The Need for a Rule Providing a Limited Opportunity for Arbitral
Reconsideration of Reasoned Awards, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 9, 53 (2004)
(acknowledging a lack of uniformity in national laws for the vacatur of an arbitral
award).
74.

Gaitis, supra note 73, at 53.

75.
Coe,supra note 4; see also Guzman, supranote45, at 1303-06 (suggesting that arbitrators seek
to develop proper reputations); Carole Silver, Models of Qualityfor Third Partiesin Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 37, 82-85 (1996) (explaining "arbitrators would be selected on
the basis of their status in the world of international commercial arbitration, as well as because of their
expertise," acknowledging information in the arbitrator marketplace affects appointments, and describing how
these reputation factors permitted that "arbitrators freed themselves from significant partisan influence from
the disputants.").
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thousands of dollars from a single arbitration and gain personal prestige from
having been involved in a significant case. 76 For those "repeat-players,"
reputation and credibility as a fair, independent, and reasoned decision maker
is vital. In multi-million and multi-billion dollar disputes, parties are likely to
be unwilling to appoint an arbitrator who is likely to be challenged, who cannot
fully consider fully the facts and laws at issue and who may be incapable of
rendering an enforceable award.
Newcomers or "one-shot-arbitrators," who may not appreciate or be
cognizant of these informal market mechanisms, present a greater challenge.
There may also be "toxic" arbitrators who leak confidential tribunal deliberations to parties; and such disclosures may put a party, who may be disatisfied
with the application of the law to the facts, in a position to disrupt proceedings
or challenge the award.77 Incentives beyond mere reputation and word of mouth
are therefore necessary to deter inappropriate conduct.
2. Market-based Incentives
Second, market based incentives related to compensation play a role in
shaping arbitrator conduct. For example, legislators might pass laws, such as
those in Canada or South Africa, which prevent arbitrators from receiving
remuneration where the have been removed for improper conduct. 78 Likewise,
arbitrators might be held personally liable for damages related to a failure to
adjudicate disputes impartially and independently.79
Particularly for toxic arbitrators, such financial incentives may be
necessary to encourage proper execution of their arbitral mandate. Whether the

76.

See generallyJohn Y. Gotanda, Setting Arbitrators'Fees: An InternationalSurvey, 33 VAND.

J. TRANSNAT'L L. 779 (2000); see also Garcia, supra note 53, at 352-53 (describing the compensation of
arbitrators as "generous" and noting, in the context of investment arbitration, that arbitrators can be paid US

$2,400 per day and referring to the prestige that accrues from sitting on an international arbitration panel);
Guzman, supra note 45, at 1302-03 (noting that "arbitrators perform their function for private gain [can be]
solely financial or a combination of financial compensation, prestige, and influence over events...").
77.
In one case, an arbitrator "unleashed his own wave of vituperative in what can only be described
as a scathing dissent. In it, he broadly accuses the other two arbitrators-including a former President of the
International Court of Justice, Judge Stephen M. Schwebel--of unethical conduct, including bias, and secretly

colluding with one another and discriminating against him in a manner which deprived him of his opportunity
to duly participate in the deliberations and preparation of the award." Garcia, supranote 53, at 351. This lead
to a challenge of the award in the Svea Appellate Court in Stockholm where Judge Schwebel and the other
two arbitrators provided testimony in court about the deliberations and the allegations of arbitrator
misconduct; the challenge was dismissed. Id.; see also Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic B.V., 42
I.L.M. 919 (Svea Ct. App. 2003) (Swed.).
78.

Franck, Liability, supra note 31, at 36-38.

79.

See generally Id.; Guzman, supra note 45.
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remedy is either in tort or contract,8 0 personal liability in appropriate circumstances can provide an incentive for arbitrators to perform their adjudicatory
function independently and not take steps to disrupt the proceedings or make
it impracticable to carry out their own mandate.
3. Institutional Incentives
Finally, institutions can play a role in creating incentives for appropriate
conduct. For example, arbitral institutions can also play a market-based role in
by removing arbitrators from their lists-or refusing to confirm arbitratorswho have violated specific ethical obligations.8 ' The AAA already takes this
type of measure.8 ' Likewise, professional organizations might consider
imposing sanctions against arbitrators who, in the past, have engaged in
inappropriate conduct. In Ex ParteArmstrong, where an arbitrator had engaged
in inappropriate conduct that did not rise to the level of "professional
misconduct," an English court permitted the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators
to require the arbitrator to submit all his decisions to the Chartered Institute in
advance. 3 Actions from institutions can therefore provide significant guidance
as to the appropriate role for arbitrators and sanctions for non-compliance.
IV. THE FUTURE ROLE OF ARBITRATORS

Thomas Franck once wrote that having decision makers who are perceived
to be legitimate enhances the legitimacy of the dispute resolution system.' 4 The
80.

See Franck, Liability, supra note 31, at 3-11 (discussing both the contractual and tortuous

nature of arbitrator liability); see also INTERNATIONAL LAW OFFICE, ARBITRATIoN-FiNLAND, SUPREME
COURT RULES

ON

ARBITRATORS'

LtABILITY,

Mar. 24, 2005,

available at http://www.

inter-

nationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?r=-9560&i=1013606 (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (discussing
the potential contract and tort-based liability and determining an arbitrator's liability is based on contract);
see generally FinnishSupreme CourtRules on the Immunity ofArbitrators,International Dispute Resolution
(White & Case LLP, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2005, availableat http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/
68d5514e-440c-4afa-b287-c7399367e80c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3d24lebf-9452-46ef-8a6fc7bfa0056304/newsletteridm_0305.pdf (last visted Mar. 12, 2006) (providing more information on the
Ruolas case).

81.

Rogers, Vocation, supra note 16, at 978-79; Rogers, Standardsof Conduct,supra note 18, at

70-73.
82.
See generally American Arbitration Association, Failure to DiscloseMay Lead to Removal
From the NationalRoster of Neutrals, availableat http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22241 (last visited Dec.
15, 2005); see also Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China art. 38, 1995 (China), available at
http:I/www.cietac.org.cn/english/laws/laws._5.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (providing that an arbitrator
who has engaged in misconduct shall be responsible at law and will have their name stricken from the panel
of possible arbitrators).
83.

Franck, Liability, supranote 31, at 55-56.

84.

See generally Franck, POWER OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 33.
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integrity and the legitimacy of international arbitration therefore depends, in
large part, upon the perceived integrity of arbitrators as well as their
independence and impartiality.
As the number of disputes continues to increase and the pool of arbitrators
has continued to expand, the role of arbitrators has evolved. No longer are
arbitrators a select pool of "grand old men" or a "gentlemen's club" made up
of those individuals with a close connection to a particular area of laws, a
relationship to the parties and perhaps with pre-existing knowledge of a dispute
whose independence was founded upon the notion of a personal sense of duty
and honor.85 The intimacy and limited size that are typical prerequisites for
informal social controls in the international arbitration community has given
way to a host of other pressures brought by its growth and expansion. 86 Today,
international commercial arbitrators have transformed themselves into a group
of technocrats who are experts in arbitration procedure and theory.87
As the constituency of international arbitration has grown, there have been
shifts in what is expected of arbitrators; not just by the parties but perhaps by
arbitrators themselves, who come from an increasingly diverse group who may
have different assumptions of what constitutes proper conduct.88 The

85.
Dezaly & Garth, supranote 3, at 33-36 (describing the "grand old men" who "played a central
role in the emergence and the recognition of arbitration"); seegenerally Louise Barrington, Arbitral Women:
A Study of Women in InternationalCommercial Arbitration,in THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO JUSTICE: THE
1996 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS 229-41 (Geoffrey M.

Beresford Hartwell ed., 1996) (describing the lack of women in international arbitration but their increasing
presence in international commercial arbitration); Michael D. Goldhaber, Madame La Prsidente, THE
AMERICAN
LAWYER,
Summer
2004,
available
at
http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/arbitration04.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (describing the
lack of women in arbitration but the increasing numbers); Dr. K.V.S.K. Nathan, Well, Why Did You Not Get
the Right Arbitrator?,15 MEALY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 10 (2000) (noting that "[t]he majority in a multimember
international arbitral tribunal is always white" and interpreting a British arbitrator's commentary as
improperly suggesting that, "arbitrators from the developing countries and women simply do not or cannot
satisfy the selection criteria" for arbitrators).
86.
Rogers, Standardsof Conduct, supra note 18, at 61-62; Dezalay & Garth, VIRTUE, supranote
3, at 36-38.
87.
Dezalay & Garth, VIRTUE, supra note 3, at 36 (describing the shift from "grand old men" to
technocrats and referring to interviews where people said the grand old man are "probably just more full of
themselves than other people and the new generation of arbitration specialists are "technically better equipped
in procedure and substance"); Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, supranote 22, at 958-59 (describing the shift away
from grand old men to a technocratic, litigation oriented and ethically trained generation).
88.
For example, the U.S. has a detailed approach to conflict of interests. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.7-1.8 (2000) available at
http://www.abanet.orglcpr/mrpc/mrpctoc.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 121-35 (2000); Bradley Wendel, The Deep Structure of Conflicts of Interest
in American Public Life, 16 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS 473 (2005). In contrast, the U.K. approach
which is not as rule-based and is more flexible and open-ended. See THE LAW SOCIETY, THE GUIDE TO THE
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International Business Association (the "IBA") Guidelines on Conflicts of
Interest 9 are a very useful starting place. Scholars, arbitrators, lawyers and
parties should continue to evaluate their impact particularly as the conducts its
own analysis of the Guidelines' utility and courts throughout the world are
beginning to use them to evaluate arbitrator behavior and misconduct. 90
As the international arbitration constituency continues to expand
arbitrators should give into their impulse to professionalize the services they
render.9 By seeking out opportunities to enhance their independence and
impartiality, this will benefit the integrity of international arbitration by
confirming the neutrality and fairness of the underlying process.92
One might consider whether the time has come for parties to incorporate
more particularized rules about independence directly into their arbitration
agreements.9 3 This will permit the parties to set their common expectations and
will put potential arbitrators on notice as to the manner in which the parties
expect the arbitration process to be managed. This is precisely why the AAA
and the Milan Chamber of Commerce have articulated ethical standards, which
are incorporated in the arbitrator's mandate.94 By clarifying an arbitrator's role
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS 313-22 (Nicola Taylor ed., 8th ed. 1999) (referring to the English
rules related to conflicts of interest); see also Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standardsand Rules:
A New Way of Understanding the Differences in Perceptionsof Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and
ForeignLawyers, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1117, 1150 (1999) (noting that in some countries, professional
ethics are handed down as an oral tradition, whose strictures address only the most obvious conflicts of
interest). The author is grateful to Susan Poser for her comments on these issues.
89.

See generally, IBA GUIDELINES, supra note 26.

90.

E-mail from Mark Kantor to Susan Franck, Dec. 14, 2005 (on file with author).

91.

Rogers, Vocation, supra note 16, at 961, 976-83.

See supra notes 32, 33 (referring to the legitimacy gained by having neutral and independent
92.
adjudicators).
93.
Rogers, Standards of Conduct, supra note 18, at 72-73, 111; see also See Hans Smit, ANationalArbitration,63 TUL. L. REV. 629, 631 (1989) (proposing language by which ethical codes can be
incorporated into the arbitration agreement via reference to some national body of law); Dr. lur. Oliver
Dillenz, Drafting InternationalCommercialArbitration Clauses, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 221,
250n.71 (proposing contract language for parties to incorporate the International Bar Association, Ethics for
International Arbitrators in their agreements). In the absence of such party agreement, U.S. courts hesitate
to impose arbitrator codes of conduct. See, e.g., ANR Coal Co., Inc. v. Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc.,
173 F.3d 493, 502 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that there was no basis for setting aside awards based on
nondisclosure because there were no applicable rules requiring disclosure); A1-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85
F.3d 680, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding that there is no source for any such generalized duty in the
absence of expressly applicable codes).
94.

MILAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, CODE OF ETHICS OF

ARBITRATORS arts. 1, 13 (2004), available at http://www.jus.uio.nollmmilan.chamber.of.commerce.
international.arbitration.rules.2004/toc (last visited Dec. 14, 2005) (requiring acceptance of the code as a
condition of appointment and permitting dismissal of the arbitrator as a penalty for noncompliance with the
code); see generally AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN
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in this fashion, institutions decrease the need for arbitrators to negotiate their
professional obligations directly with the parties, which might otherwise create
an adversarial relationship with the potential to set up a basis for challenging
the arbitrator or eradicate the parties' trust in the arbitrator(s).
While not as advanced as the approach of the AAA and Milan, the ICC
and even recent proposals for ICSID95 suggest another way to manage-namely
by having arbitrators sign confirmations that they have continuing obligations
to remain impartial and independent. Particularly for parties who are engaging
in international arbitration for the first time, expanding and clarifying the
expected code of conduct for arbitrators will undoubtedly decrease misperceptions and misunderstandings amongst parties, lawyers, and arbitrators.
V. CONCLUSION

Fostering the legitimacy of arbitrators is critical.96 They are the guardians
of a system that is imperative for the flourishing of international trade and
investment. Setting clear and reliable expectations about arbitrators' proper
role will help promote the legitimacy of a system with a critical impact on the
global economy.
Parties, arbitrators, and institutions should appreciate the respect to be
gained by engaging in independent decision-making. They should therefore
articulate clearly what conduct is expected of international arbitrators and
provide incentives to avoid inappropriate conduct. In this way we can further
arbitration's ultimate justice-promoting objectives and promote the integrity of
a dispute resolution mechanism with critical international implications.

COMMERCIAL DISPuTES (2004), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21958 (last visited Mar. 21,
2006).
95.
Recent proposals at ICSID would require arbitrators to sign the following statement: Attached
is a statement of (a) my past and present professional, business and other relationships (if any) with the parties
and (b) any other circumstance that might cause my reliability for independent judgment to be questioned
by a party. I acknowledge that by signing this declaration I assume a continuing obligation promptly to notify
the Secretary-General of the Centre of any such relationship or circumstance that subsequently arises during
this proceeding.
Working Paper, supranote 5. Expanding the disclosure requirements for arbitrators has become more
important with the large number of new cases being registered by the Centre and the increased scope for
possible conflicts of interest.
96.
See generallyCharles H. Brower H, Structure Legitimacy andNAFTA 's Investment Chapter,
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37 (2000); Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1584-85; Franck,
FAIRNEss, supra note 33, at 33-34; Franck, POWER OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 33.

